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Abstract
Returns-based beliefs provides an explanation for the anomaly between the the-
ory and empirics for the one-shot and finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games.
Even in a fully specified game, there is strategic uncertainty as players attempt
to coordinate their actions. Therefore players form subjective probabilities of the
actions of their opponents. We provide a new method termed the ‘returns-based
beliefs’ approach of forming subjective probabilities that is based upon the expected
returns of a particular strategy, in proportion to the total expected returns of all
strategies. This method can be applied even in the absence of knowledge of the
players’ respective histories.
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1 Introduction
Economists have highlighted a number of game-theoretic contradictions and paradoxes in
which individual decision-making in real-world situations is at odds with what is predicted
by game theory (Goeree and Holt 2001; Luce and Raiffa 1957; Selten 1978; Rosenthal
1981; Reny 1993; Binmore 1987; Bicchieri 1989; Petit and Sugden 2001). One of the most
widely analysed games in economics is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a two-by-two noncoopera-
tive game. Some empirical tests of this game demonstrate that in the real world people are
often more cooperative than that predicted by the outcome of this game in theory. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma also lies at the heart of important concepts in game theory such as the
‘Nash equilibrium’ (Nash 1951). In this paper we provide an explanation for why coop-
erative strategies might be played in a one-shot and finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. We propose an alternative method by which people might form their beliefs to
play their strategies. We call this ‘returns-based beliefs’ which is the expected returns of a
particular strategy, in proportion to the total expected returns of all strategies. We argue
that this belief structure, which is based upon subjective probabilities, might explain the
rationale behind the adoption of cooperative strategies in a one-shot and finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
The payoff to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is as illustrated in Figure 1 where two
agents have to decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Let us call the agents player 1
and player 2 respectively. If both cooperate they both get a payoff of 4. However, both
player 1 and player 2 could be better off by playing Defect if the other player continues
to play Cooperate. If player 1 chooses to cooperate and player 2 chooses to defect then
player 2 gains with a payoff of 6 while player 1 loses with a payoff of only 0.5 and vice
versa if player 2 cooperates but player 1 defects. Therefore, both players would reason that
they are better of defecting and as a result end up obtaining a payoff of 1 each. This is
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clearly less than the Pareto optimum of obtaining a payoff of 4 each by both cooperating.
However, because the players are unable to communicate beforehand, game theory predicts
that they will both play the Defect strategy, thereby making them both worse off. This
is the only Nash equlibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as there is no incentive for any of
the players to change their strategies. Yet, empirical testing of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in
laboratory experiments has shown that people are prone to play the cooperative strategies
far more often than game theory alone might lead us to predict in both one-shot games
and in finitely repeated games. These studies have also demonstrated that as the benefits
from cooperation increase, players are more likely to cooperate, and that as the loss from
not cooperating increases, the likelihood of cooperation increases as well (Sally 1995).
For example, theoretically it has been shown that the strategy where both players
cooperate is possible to obtain in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Wilson 1986,
Shubik 1970, Kreps et al 1982, Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984). Equally, scholars have em-
phasised that cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner Dilemma game is an important finding
of experimental research that needs to be further understood (Field 2001, Janssen 2008).
Some economists have proposed various explanations for these experimental findings: for
example, altruistic punishment among genetically unrelated people when the gains from
reputation are small or absent (Fehr and Gachter, 2002); the ability to recognize untrust-
worthy opponents (Janssen 2008); and the incorporation of notions of fairness into game
theory through which people help others that help them and hurt others that hurt them
(Rabin 1993). Moreover, in the case of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
the leading theoretical explanations for cooperative behaviour here are reputation building
and altruisim (Kreps et al 1982, Andreoni and Miller 1993, Cooper et al. 1996). To all of
these explanations, we add an alternative: we propose in this paper a new explanation for
cooperation in a one-shot and a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game that is based
upon subjective probabilities and returns based beliefs. Our explanation for the level of
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Figure 1: Payoffs and Dominated Claims
cooperation through the evolution of the game in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is not
based on reputation or altruism, but directly on the consequences of strategic interactions
as a result of returns based belief formation.
Game theory models systematically human behavior when strategic interactions exist.
In conventional game theory, the solution concept such as a Nash equilibrium is critical
in forming the basis for the prior distribution of beliefs that players hold. In determining
the outcome of the game these prior beliefs held by the players are fulfilled in equilibrium.
However, a player’s actions are determined by her beliefs about other players which may
depend upon their real-life contexts such as custom or history (Aumann and Dreze 2008).
Game theory is also a normative theory that describes how people ought to behave rather
than a descriptive theory about how people actually behave (Kadane and Larkey 1982,
1983). For example, Harsanyi (1982) contended that normative game theory was not as
helpful as ‘an empirically supported psychological theory making probabilistic predictions
about the strategies people are likely to use, . . . given the nature of the game and given
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their own psychological makeup’ (p.122). This psychological makeup might be conditioned
by the past experience of individuals’ beliefs about an opponent’s play. This is termed
the ‘subjective’ or personal interpretation of probability. Subjective probability is the
probability that a person assigns to a possible outcome, or some process based on his own
judgement, the likelihood that the outcome will be obtained (DeGroot 1975, pp. 4).
In a similar vein, Herbert Simon (1957) distinguished between subjective and objective
rationality. Subjective rationality is behavior that is rational given the perceptual and
evaluational premises of the subject. Objective rationality is behavior that is rational as
viewed by the experimenter. Human behavior is likely to be subjectively rational but not
necessarily objectively rational. The implication is that the experiences of the individual
might feed into the so-called perceptive and evaluational premises of the individual and
influence thereby the subjective probabilities, which then influences the strategies chosen.
An implication of the subjective probability approach is that the chosen strategy might
not be consistent with the equilibrium predictions of an objectively rational outcome
(Roth and Schoumaker 1983b). The players’ experience is an important determinant
of the player’s expectations which might lead to outcomes that might not be the Nash
equilibrium prediction (Roth and Schoumaker 1983a).
Subjective probabilities might have important consequences for the outcome of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and for its empirical testing. We suggest an alternative basis
upon which beliefs in game theory might be formed - returns-based beliefs - and we present
the corresponding numerical results. Returns-based beliefs are important when forming
subjective probabilities because we can show that they can be applied even when the
players are not knowledgable about their respective histories. We show that as long as
the tempatation to defect is not large, or the benefits to cooperate are significant, then
players are likely to cooperate. Our results correspond very closely to empirical studies
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Section 2 revisits the Prisoner’s Dilemma and provides an
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explanation for the reconciliation of the empirical findings and the theoretical predictions
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma using returns based beliefs. Section 3 concludes.
2 Cooperative behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
This section provides an explanation for cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We show that a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence conducted on the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game may be based upon agents playing mixed strategies. We discuss a
manner in which agents form beliefs that is based upon their expected returns. We dis-
cuss how this forms the subjective probabilities, and how the numerical results obtained
correspond closely with previous empirical evidence on this issue.
2.1 The formation of beliefs
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the elimination of dominated strategies is used to derive
the Nash equilibrium of (Defect, Defect). However, clearly because the empirical evidence
is at odds with the theoretical outcome of a Nash equilibrium, there must be an alternative
manner in which agents are choosing their strategies. Other economists have argued that
perhaps we need to examine psychological motives more to understand behavior in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and have suggested examining the process of cognitive reasoning
(Rubinstein 2006 and 2007). In this section, we propose an explanation that is based
on players wanting to cooperate on their strategies, as such cooperation provides better
returns than non-cooperation.
In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, ideally, the agents would like to cooperate by
coordinating their actions on the joint claims that will maximize their returns, which is
(4,4). Intrinsically, each player knows the benefits of cooperation and hence he or she
may actually play the cooperative strategy with positive probabilities, that coordinates
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with the other player. For example, research has shown that human beings are prone
to cooperative behavior based on reciprocity (Axelrod 1984, Axelrod and Dion 1988).
Therefore, the history of human interactions are likely to influence the general disposition
of players to want to cooperate1. We need to factor this cooperative bias into our decision
making framework in order to predict how players should behave in a competitive situation
where cooperation is possible and could produce better outcomes2 (Friedman 1996).
In this paper we argue that the willingness to coorperate might be influenced by past ex-
perience, generating ‘strategic uncertainty’. We define strategic uncertainty as uncertainty
concerning the actions and beliefs (and beliefs about the beliefs) of others (Brandenberger
1996, Morris and Shin 2002). Researchers have argued that strategic uncertainty can
arise even when all possible actions and returns are completely specified and are common
knowledge (Van Huyck et al 1990). The rational decision-maker has to form beliefs about
the strategy that the other decision maker will use as a result of strategic uncertainty. As
a consequence, players form their beliefs about the probabilities that other players play in
order to determine in turn their best-response strategy. Hence, the best response strategy
of one player is likely to be based upon the mixed strategy of the other player. The mix-
ture is because of the uncertainty regarding the conjecture about the choice by the other
players3 (Brandenburger and Dekel 1989; Brandenberger 2007). This is succintly sum-
1Farell and Rabin (1996) have argued that even with communication there would be ‘cheap talk’ and
hence the communication is not credible. However, Sally (1995) shows that communication does result in
an increase in cooperation among players.
2To add to this line of reasoning, psychologists have argued that cooperation may be prompted by
altruism, by the desire to conform to social norms, or by adhering to the dictates of one’s conscience
(Dawes 1980). In addition, economists have shown that ‘people’s natural tendency to cooperate’ is an
important trait that subjects bring to experimental situations from the outside (Andreoni and Miller 1993,
p. 571).
3We are not assuming that the opponent is using a randomized strategy. The mixture merely reflects
the representation of player 1’s belief about player 2. As Wilson (1986, pp.47) points out, although
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marised by Rabin (1993) that ‘In psychological games, there can be a difference between
interpreting mixed strategies literally as purposeful mixing by a player versus interpreting
them as uncertainty by other players’ (Rabin 1993, p.1286).
The issue of mixed strategies is also relevant when one considers the concept of the
elimination of dominated strategies. The concept of elimination of dominated strategies
assumes that a strategy that is dominated will never be played. However, empirical studies
show that dominated co-operative strategies might be played with positive probabilities
(Cooper et al 1990). The empirical findings show that playing dominated cooperative
strategies with positive probabilities could change the results in a significant way. For
example, forming beliefs about the strategies that the other decision maker might use is a
subjective assessment based on the previous experiences of the player. Hence, research has
shown that it is possible for the player to expect an opponent to play all possible strategies,
including strictly dominated strategies, with positive probabilities. For example, Roth and
Schoumaker (1983b) in their seminal study showed that more than one outcome that is
not the Nash equilibrium outcome, could be considered to be consistent with perfect
rationality when the ‘outcome depends on subjective expectations of the players which
are not determined by the data of the game’ (p. 1338). If the experience of the individual
has been to get a share of a bargain that is not a Nash equilibrium outcome, then it is
reasonable to assume that the player will continue to expect the non-Nash equilibrium
outcome in the next game (Roth and Schoumaker 1983a, 1983b). Therefore, a player who
knows that the non-Nash equilibrium belief is held by the opponent could be deemed to
be rational when forming a subjective assessment of the opponent’s play by taking this
belief into account (Basu 1990). This might be construed as an error by the player if one
were to look at this game purely from the perspective of objective rationality. In this
it makes little difference to the mathematics, conceptually this distinction between randomization and
subjective beliefs to explain the mixed strategies is a pertinent one.
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case, rationality of perception which might exist does not necessarily correspond to the
objective probabilities that would result if the dominated strategies were to be deleted
(as in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma). Correspondingly, we argue that ‘subjective’
rationality coexists with the rationality of perception driven by the previous experiences
of the individuals. Given such a perception, we need to re-examine the process of deletion
of dominated strategies.
The deletion of dominated strategies assumes that the probability of playing these
strategies is zero and hence they are not expected to be played. As discussed earlier,
when subjective probabilities are held, dominated strategies could be played with positive
probabilities Therefore, could one delete dominated strategies when such subjective prob-
abilities are held? We attempt to answer this by examining the game in Figure 1. The
figure shows the payoff for the various strategies of both players. In the case of elimination
of dominant strategies, player 1 would not play cooperate as player 2 could trump him by
playing Defect. Therefore, player 1 would be better off playing Defect and so will player
2 in that case and we reach the Nash equilibrium of (Defect, Defect) by eliminating the
co-operate strategies which is dominated. However, if we assume that player 1 holds the
belief that player 2 is likely to cooporate even with a very small probability because of
some historical experience of player 2 (for example, the need to want to coordinate the
strategy with player 1 and earn the same payoff) then it would be rational for player 1 to
also choose the strategy cooperate with a positive probability. Now it is easy to see that
it is no longer the case that strategy Cooperate is dominated. This is because if player 2
were to play both Cooperate and Defect with some positive probability, player 1 could do
better by mixing between Cooperate and Defect than to play Defect. This result is shown
using the example of the numerical model in the next section. The common practice is to
eliminate strictly dominated strategies from a normal form game in formulating equilibria
in mixed strategies (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986). However, the practice of eliminating
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strategies (Cooperate, Cooperate) via a process of deletion of dominated strategies is not
appropriate, because playing a mixed strategy between Cooperate and Defect could yield
a better payoff than playing the Nash equilibrium strategy of Defect when the other player
plays all strategies with some positive probability4.
In order to illustrate our results we need some plausible set of assumptions about
how agents form beliefs with respect to the probability of the opponent’s strategy. We
suggest that one way in which agents might do so is by basing their decisions on ‘returns-
based beliefs’. In this method, player 1 plays strategies based on the probabilities of the
proportion of returns over the total returns for each possible claim by player 2. The next
section describes the approach and results associated with this method of belief formation.
2.2 Returns-based beliefs and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the following discussion, we describe a possible subjective probability formation based
on returns based beliefs. First, we discuss the concept of subjective probabilities and its
implications for the Nash equilibrium in order to provide an understanding of why this
method of forming beliefs might be reasonable. We assume that players are expected
utility maximizers. The traditional approach in game theory when mixed strategies are
used is for a player to choose probabilities (over their own strategies) in such a manner as
to make the other player indifferent between the different strategies. The implication of
4Conventionally, any mixed strategy will have a support in pure strategies. However, the pure strategy
(Cooperate) will get eliminated by the deletion of dominated strategies which suggests that the play of a
mixed strategy based upon a support in pure strategies would not be apposite in this context . However,
because of our argument that invokes subjective probabilities, all the strategies are played with positive
probabilities. As a result we argue that the deletion of dominated strategies is no longer appropriate.
Therefore, a mixed strategy can exist if one player experiences uncertainty with respect to his conjecture
about the choice of the other player.
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this is that each player’s equilibrium strategy depends only on the other players’ payoff and
not their own in order to make the other player indifferent between the different strategies
(Amaldos and Jain 2001). However, this approach of making the opponent indifferent
would not be the case when non-equilibrium strategies are chosen via the use of subjective
probabilities. When such non-equilibrium outcomes are chosen, each player maximizes
their own expected values based on their conjecture of what the opponent is likely to
do. Therefore, the probabilities are chosen to maximize their own expected values rather
than to make the opponent indifferent to the different strategies. As discussed earlier,
driven by the desire to want to cooperate, for example in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
there is uncertainty regarding the conjecture about the choice of the other player. Hence,
the player holds an opinion based on the subjective probability with respect to all of the
unknown contingencies affecting his payoffs. In particular the player is assumed to have
‘an opinion about the major contingency faced, namely what the opposing player is likely
to do’ (Kadane and Larkey 1982, pp. 115). Kadane and Larkey (1982, pp. 115) have
expressed the implications of this line of thought very neatly as follows: ‘If I think my
opponent will choose strategy i (i = 1, . . . I) with probability pi, I will choose any
strategy j maximizing
∑I
i=1 piuij, where uij, is the utility to me of the situation in which
my opponent has chosen i and I have chosen j......the opponent’s utilities are important
only in that they affect my views {pi} of what my opponent may do....’.
Therefore, it follows that if player 2 is not expected to play the Nash equilibrium
strategy than it might be optimal for player 1 also not to play the Nash equilibrium strategy
as doing so would give player 1 a better payoff. This implies that the Nash equilibrium is a
special case when each player is assumed to believe that the other is sure to play the Nash
equilibrium strategy. Let us revisit the concept of objective and subjective probabilities to
help clarify the context of this discussion: the Nash equilibrium solution concept assumes
rationality from the perspective of an external observer. However, at the level of the
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individual player, assumptions about the opponent’s beliefs may be conditioned by past
experience and hence be different from the priors held by the rational external observer. In
situations of strategic interaction such as in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the players might
hold subjective probabilities that are different from the objective probabilities demanded
by the Nash equilibrium solution concept. When these probabilities are the same we get
the special case of the Nash equilibrium. However, there is no compelling reason a priori
for these probabilities to definitely be the same. Although any possible distribution of
probabilities could be a possibility based upon the subjective method of forming them,
we shall try to propose a reasonable subjective probability belief that the players might
use when they do not know each other or their respective histories. We shall call this
‘returns-based beliefs’, which we describe in more detail below.
We posit that the players have a desire to want to cooperate based on the premise
that historical experience tells them that this might provide a better return. However,
the rational decision maker has to form beliefs about the opponent’s play due to the
strategic uncertainty about what the opponent is likely to play. As discussed before, the
decision maker is trying to maximize expected returns based on these beliefs. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that the decision maker would assign probabilities based on the
expected returns from playing the different strategies. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume
that the opponent also assigns probabilities based on the opponent’s expected returns
given the probabilities of the focal decision maker. Following this line of reasoning, our
analysis is based on a model for which the decision probabilities are proportional to the
expected returns. We assume that agents form beliefs based upon the expected returns
for a particular strategy over the total expected returns of all strategies, assuming the
opponent plays all possible strategies. Our proposed approach has both theoretical and
empirical justification. First, for the theoretical justification we defer to Luce (1959) who
showed using probability axioms that if the ratio of probabilities associated with any two
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decisions is independent of the payoff of any other decisions, then the choice probabilities
for decision i can be expressed as a ratio of the expected payoff for that decision over the
total expected payoff for all decisions:
pie
i
Σjpiej
where piei is the expected returns associated with
decision i. Second, this method of arriving at decision probabilities has been supported
by empirical work which provides empirical justification for our approach. In particular,
empirical research for paired comparison data supports the Luce (1959) method of arriving
at decision probabilities such that the probability for choosing x over y, P (x, y) = v(x)
[v(x)+v(y)]
where v(x) and v(y) are the scale values of choosing x and y respectively (Abelson and
Bradley 1954, Bradley and Terry 1952). We operationalize our model as follows. In this
model, each player chooses among j,m = 2 possible strategies and the expected payoffs
are given by the summation below:
piei (j) = Σ
n
m=1pii(j,m)pi(m), j,m = Cooperate,Defect (1)
where pii(j,m) is player i
′s payoff from choosing a claim equal to j when the other
player claims m and pi(m) is the belief probabilities held by player i about player j
playing strategy m. The decision probabilities in turn follow the specification outlined
above which is proportional to the expected returns as follows,
Di(j) =
piei (j)
Σnm=1pi
e
i (m)
(2)
In our model we assume a Nash-like equilibrium in belief formation such that the belief
probabilities matches the decision probabilities for both players 1 and 2 respectively. This
symmetry in probabilities is achieved by iterating between the expected payoff in equation
(1) and the decision probabilities in equation (2). To begin the analysis, let us assume that
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player 1 believes that player 2 plays each of the strategies with equal probabilities i.e. 0.5.
We then multiply 0.5 with the rewards of player 1 (as per Figure 1) to get the expected
returns as shown in Figure 2. For example, the number 2.00 (row one and column one
in Figure 2) is obtained by multiplying 0.5 by 4 (the first number in parentheses in row
one and column one in Figure 1). The second last column labelled ‘Total’ shows the total
rewards for a particular claim for player 1 for all possible claims by player 2. For example,
2.25 is the sum of all the rewards (2.00+0.25) for the cooperate strategy by player 1 when
player 2 plays cooperate and defect with equal probabilities.
We would now need to calculate the probabilities that player 1 will play the various
claim strategies. As discussed above, player 1 is concerned about his opponent’s returns
only to the extent that he wants to maximize his own returns subject to the opponent’s
play. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that player 1 assigns probabilities to
each of the claim strategies proportional to the expected returns of playing that strategy.
The last column in Figure 2 depicts the probabilities that player 1 would play a particular
claim in response to the various claim strategies for player 2. This is the same as the
conjecture that player 2 has about player 1’s probabilities. This is derived by dividing the
reward player 1 gets for a particular claim strategy by the total rewards for all possible
claims of player 1. For example, the number in the last column and first row of Figure
2, 0.392 is obtained by dividing 2.25 (the number in the first row of the column labelled
‘Total’ in Figure 2) by the total of 6.05 (the number in the far right row in the column
labelled ‘Total’ in Figure 2).
However, so far player 1 and player 2 have different beliefs about each other’s prob-
abilities of playing a claim. Player 2’s expected returns can be calculated by applying
the probabilities that player 1 will play each of the strategies as calculated from Figure 2
above. In a similar way, player 1’s revised probabilities for each of the claim strategies can
be calculated based on the returns based method described for player 1 above. We now
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Figure 2: Player 1’s Probabilities
revise the expected returns in Figure 2 with the new probabilities (as compared to the
equal probabilities that we started out with). This process provides updated probabilities
for player 2 for each claim strategy, shown by the revised numbers for the last row of
Figure 2. This process can be repeated until the probabilities for players 1 and 2 converge.
Conducting this iterative process shows that these probabilities do actually converge after
about three to four iterations. Since the players are symmetric, it is not unreasonable to
assume without any further information about history or preferences that they would have
the same subjective beliefs about each other.
The probabilities converge for both players to 0.387 for the cooperate strategy and
0.613 for the defect stratgey. Therefore, the ‘returns based beliefs’ show that the players
will play the cooperate strategies with positive probabilities which is in line with empirical
evidence. In addition the empirical evidence shows that as the benefits from cooperation
increases the players are more likely to cooperate. Sally (1995) showed using a metanalysis
of over 100 studies that ‘The one major consistency with rational self interest is that
the temptation to defect decreases the level of cooperation’ (p.75, Sally 1995). Another
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way of looking at this is that as the opportunity to increase one’s reward by defecting
from unanimous coorperation decreases, then the likelihood of cooperation decreases. In
addition, the analysis shows that as the loss from not cooperating increases, the likelihood
of cooperation increases too. Sally (1995) proposed a method of calculating the Temptation
Index and Loss Index as follows:
Loss = (C(x)−D(0))/C(x) (3)
Temptation = (D(x− 1)− C(x))/C(x) (4)
where
n =2 (number of players)
x = number of operators (0 < x < n)
C(x) =payoff for each of the x cooperators
D(x) = payoff to each of the (n− x) defectors
Based on our example in Figure 1, the value of the indices are as follows,
Loss = (4−1)/4 = 3/4 (75%) and Temptation = (6−4)/4 = 1/2 (50%). As one allows
the benefit from cooperation from the (Cooperate, Cooperate) payoff increase from 4 to
5.8, the loss index increases from 75.0% to 82.8% which in turn increases the probabilities
of co-operation from 0.39 to 0.47 as shown in Figure 3. In addition, as the payoff from
(Defect, Cooperate) is increased from 6 to 7.8, the temptation index increases from 50.0%
to 85.0% which in turn decreases the probability of cooperation from 0.39 to 0.35 as shown
in Figure 4. This result is consistent with empirical evidence from the Prisoner’s Dilemma
games.
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Our approach is different to previous studies that show the plausibility of cooperation
in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. For example, Fehr and Gachter (2002) show
that people experience negative emotions towards defectors and are therefore willing to
punish them. This act is called ‘altruistic punishment’. Although such punishment is
costly and yields no material benefits to the punisher it acts as a deterrent to defection
which can then explain cooperation in one shot games among strangers. Jansenn (2008)
shows that the option available to players to withdraw from playing and the ability to
recognize untrustworthy opponents could create conditions where players cooperate in
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. This is because the ability of players to withdraw
from the game and not play an untrustworthy opponent and the consequent social welfare
preference of not wanting to be seen as contributing to the level of untrustworthiness
in society results in cooperation in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. On the other
hand, Rabin (1993) showed that incorporating fairness into game theory could result in
cooperative outcomes more than conventional game theory would predict. The idea is that
people like to help those who are seen to be helping them and hurt those who are seen to
be hurting them. Therefore, Rabin (1993) shows that so long as the material gains from
defecting are not too large each player would want to help the other by cooperating which
results in the (Cooperate, Cooperate) outcome (p. 1288, Rabin 1993).
In this paper we propose an alternative explanation for the (Cooperate, Cooperate)
outcome in the Prisoner’s Dilemma that is based on subjective probabilities and returns
based beliefs formation. Our approach enables us to provide a plausible explanation for
two anomalies between the theoretical predictions of one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games
and the empirical evidence: (1) the inverse relationship between cooperation and the
temptation to defect and (2) the positive relationship between cooperation and the gains
from cooperation.
The next section extends the application of the returns-based belief approach to the
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finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
2.3 Finitely Repeated Game
The discussion so far has been on one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. However, cooper-
ation is also evident from empirical studies of finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
(Andreoni and Miller 1993, Cooper et al. 1996, Dal Bo 2005). Economic theory predicts
(Defect, Defect) as the equilibrium play for all rounds of the game in a finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, empirical evidence shows a high level of cooperation in early
rounds of the game with the rate of cooperation declining towards the final rounds of the
finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Andreoni and Miller 1993, Dal Bo 2005). In
addition to the declining rate of cooperation, Cooper et al. (1996) found that the rate of
cooperation was higher in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game than the one-shot
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. To date, the leading theories of cooperation are based on either
reputation building or altruism. Krepps et al. (1982) show that cooperation is possible
in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma due to the presence of incomplete information
about the true payoffs of the rival. In such a setting a small belief that an opponent will
cooperate is sufficient for cooperative play as players would like to build their reputation
for cooperation. A leading alternative explanation of cooperation is based on players being
altruistic. In the altruism theory, one can think of the players receiving an additional pay-
off from being cooperative. So for example, Cooper et al. (1996) argue that the reputation
model is inconsistent with cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner Dilemma game as there is
no opportunity to build reputation. In addition, these authors show that altruism alone
cannot explain the cooperation rates over time in a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, as the observed cooperation rate is higher than that predicted by the theory with
altruistic players.
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We provide an alternative explanation for the observed cooperation in finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games. As before, let us assume that the players are playing the game
as shown in Figure 1. However, we now extend our analysis to the case where the players
repeatedly play the game 5 times. Our approach to calculating the level of cooperation
involves a five step procedure:
(1) First calculate the level of cooperation and defection based on the returns based
approach discussed in the previous section for the last game (Game 5). In this case, and
as before, the probability of playing the cooperate strategy and the defect strategy would
be 0.387 and 0.613 respectively.
(2) Calculate the value of the game. This is the expected value given the proba-
bilities for cooperation and defection respectively. The value of the game is, 2.52 =
0.387*(0.387*(4)+0.613*(0.5))+0.613*(0.387*(6)+0.613*(1)).
(3) The value of Game 5 is then added to each component of the returns to each player
(each column and each row) in the game as shown in Figure 1 to work out the payoff
matrix for Game 4.
(4) The cooperation and defect rates are calculated for Game 4 based on returns based
beliefs as discussed in the previous section, and the value of the game is calculated as per
the method in point (2) above.
(5) The value of Game 4 is then added to the payoff matrix as per point (3) above to
get the payoff of Game 3. The same procedure is repeated to calculate the cooperative
and defect strategies for Game 3, Game 2 and Game 1 respectively.
Using the procedure outlined above we are able to calculate the cooperate and defect
probabilities for each round of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the
results are shown in Table 1.
The results are striking indeed. One of the most significant features of the results
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Probabilities Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5
Cooperate 
Defect
0.493
0.507
0.485
0.515
0.471
0.529
0.443
0.557
0.387
0.613
Table 1: Probabilities of Cooperation and Defect from Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma
shown in Table 1 is that they are entirely consistent with the observations from previous
empirical studies of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Cooper 1996). In
particular, the results show that
(1) Cooperation is possible in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
(2) Higher levels of cooperation are evident in early parts of the game with the level
of cooperation declining as one approaches the final game.
(3) The level of cooperation in early parts of the finitely repeated game is higher than
in the one shot game.
Significantly, our explanation for the level of cooperation as the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game evolves is not based on either reputation or altruism arguments, but
emerges directly as a consequence of the strategic interactions resulting from returns based
belief formation.
3 Conclusion
The empirical testing of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game in laboratory experiments
has shown that when the temptation to defect is low, or the benefits to cooperation are
high, players do not play the Nash equilibrium outcome as suggested by the game (Sally
1995). In this paper, we show that even when the game is fully specified, there is strategic
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uncertainty when players try to coordinate their actions, based on an understanding that
both cooperating could yield a better outcome. We argue that this uncertainty induces
players to play mixed strategies. Although the common practice is to eliminate strictly
dominated strategies from normal form games in formulating equilibria in mixed strate-
gies, empirical studies have shown that dominated cooperative strategies might be played
with positive probabilities (Cooper et al 1990). Based on such findings, we hypothesize
that when agents form subjective probabilities about the strategies of the other players,
strategies that were previously eliminated via deletion of dominated strategies cannot be
eliminated any longer. This is because the use of mixed strategies might result in better
returns than the Nash equilibrium strategy of playing defect. We show that using mixed
strategies (including the dominated strategies) allows us to provide a plausible explanation
for the empirical evidence discussed in previous studies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We
show that as long as the temptation to defect is not large or the benefit of cooperation
is large, then players are likely to play the cooperative strategy. Our approach enables
us to provide a plausible explanation for two anomalies between the theoretical predic-
tions of one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games and the empirical evidence: first, the inverse
relationship between cooperation and the temptation to defect; and second, the positive
relationship between cooperation and the gains from cooperation. In addition, in the fi-
nitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game we are able to provide a possible explanation
for the observation that (1) higher levels of cooperation are evident in early parts of the
game with the level of cooperation declining as one approaches the final game and (2) the
level of cooperation in early parts of the finitely repeated game is higher than in the one
shot game. Our explanation for the level of cooperation through the evolution of the re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is not based on other leading theories of cooperation such
as reputation or altruism, but on the consequences of strategic interactions as a result of
returns-based belief formation. Our proposed new method of returns-based beliefs forming
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the subjective probabilities is based upon the expected returns of a particular strategy, in
proportion to the total expected returns of all strategies. Moreover, returns-based beliefs
are important because we can show that they can be applied even when the players do
not know their respective histories. We believe that if returns-based belief formation is in
fact a possible explanation for the experimental observations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, then this might amplify the possibility of testing other observable anomalies in game
theory.
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